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The article discusses how the emergence of a policy of financial stability
in international and European economic law has an impact on private
relations, leading private law itself to become an instrument of financial
stability. The result is an intersection of financial regulation and private
law whereby financial regulation addresses consumer protection
top-down and private law addresses financial stability bottom-up. The
incorporation of the goal of financial stability nonetheless creates
tensions in private law, since the latter aims at further objectives,
occasionally leading to conflicts. The article shows how the
accommodation of those objectives requires the striking of balances, and
discusses instances in which case law of European courts arbitrated
between different interests producing dissimilar results in different
contexts. This casts further doubts on the consistency of the notion of
financial stability as a policy or legal principle; despite its prominence at
the international and European level, it unfolds in different forms
depending on the interests at stake.
1. Introduction
The pursuit of “financial stability” emerged as a goal of paramount
importance in international and European economic law after the 2007–2008
global financial crisis (hereafter: GFC) and the ensuing European debt crisis.1
In the 2010s, the Union introduced a number of reforms with the aim of
achieving sound public finances and stabilizing financial markets2 through
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improved supervision.3 As financial stability assumed the position of a new
overarching objective of EU law,4 the EU underwent what resembles a
“constitutional mutation”.5 Nonetheless, while the term appears
uncontroversial and beneficial in nature, as a necessary antidote to the
dangerous instability resulting from a crisis which soon spilled over from the
financial to the “real economy”, its implementation is far from unambiguous.
First, the notion is a multifaceted and evolving one which can be associated
with different objectives6 and which shows a propensity to blur into bordering
concepts, possibly leading to legal uncertainties and disputes.7 Second,
and leaving aside the more fundamental observation that financial stability in
itself appears to be a self-defeating concept,8 the objective – depending on the
way in which it is defined9 and pursued – might stand in tension with
other goals which have either traditionally or recently dominated the
landscape of economic law: liberalization,10 integration,11 harmonization,12
3. Ferran, “Understanding the new institutional architecture of EU financial market
supervision” in Ferrarini, Hopt, and Wymeersch (Eds.), Financial Regulation and Supervision.
A Post-Crisis Analysis (OUP, 2012), pp. 111–158.
4. Lo Schiavo, The Role of Financial Stability in EU Law and Policy (Kluwer, 2017).
5. Tuori and Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis. A Constitutional Analysis (Cambridge University
Press, 2014), p. 117.
6. The notion of financial stability is now being infused with considerations linked to the
idea of sustainability, see Commission Communication, “Action Plan: Financing sustainable
growth”, COM(2018)97 final.
7. The unclear demarcation line between financial and monetary stability is relevant to the
disagreement between the ECJ (Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, EU:C:2015:400; Case C-493/17,
Weiss, EU:C:2018:1000) and the German Constitutional Court (2 BvR 859/15 of 5 May 2020).
8. Minsky, “The financial-instability hypothesis: Capitalist processes and the behavior of
the economy” in Kindleberger and Laffargue (Eds.), Financial Crises: Theory, History, and
Policy (Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 13–39. In legal literature,Alexander,Principles
of Banking Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2019), p. 47.
9. Traditionally, stability has been given a negative definition, thus “a state of affairs in
which episodes of instability are unlikely to occur”, Allen and Wood, “Defining and achieving
financial stability”, 2 Journal of Financial Stability (2006), 152–172. It is now predominantly
understood as the capability of withstanding shocks: according to the ECB: “Financial stability
can be defined as a condition in which the financial system – which comprises financial
intermediaries, markets and market infrastructures – is capable of withstanding shocks and the
unravelling of financial imbalances”, available at <www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/financial-
stability/> (all websites last visited 4 Jan. 2021).
10. On the significance of the notion of “general good”, which covers financial stability, for
trade in financial services, see Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational, Comparative,
Commercial, Financial and Trade Law. Vol. 3 (Bloomsbury/Hart, 2019), p. 806; Casey and
Lannoo, The MiFID Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 181.
11. Discussing conflicts and trade-offs between “domestic” stability and international
financial integration as well as a “global” stability, see Lupo-Pasini, “Financial stability in
international law”, 18Melbourne Journal of International Law (2017), 48–70.
12. Andenas and Chiu, “Financial stability and legal integration in financial regulation”, 38
EL Rev. (2013), 335–359.
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innovation,13 and possibly economic growth,14 with the latter becoming a
burning issue especially in times of economic recession. Equally contentious
is its possible conflict with property rights and private autonomy and,
therefore, with rights and values which are preponderant in private law.
Reflecting on the developments of the last few years, this contribution focuses
on the interplay between the internationally promoted goal of financial
stability and private law, paying particular attention to consumer protection.
At first sight, the two domains are distinct: financial stability appears to be the
goal of financial regulation,15 while private law pursues objectives such as,
among others, the protection of the consumer. In other words, financial
regulation serves the function of ensuring financial stability, “whereas private
law is primarily concerned with the balancing of rights and duties between
private parties”.16 That separation allows private law to “go further than the
minimum norms necessary for ensuring the stability of the financial
system”.17 At the same time, however, the separation has been traditionally
invoked in order to shield regulators from direct actions by harmed
investors.18
The distinction between the two domains – not always crystal clear in the
way it is relied on by the courts19 – is becoming even more blurred. On the one
hand, it is long established that financial regulation does not only aim at
stability – which is in fact a more recent objective – but also assumes as its role
13. With regard to fintech, Omarova, “Technology v technocracy: Fintech as a regulatory
challenge”, 6 Journal of Financial Regulation (2020), 75–124; Arner, Zetzsche, Buckley and
Barberis, “Fintech and regtech: Enabling innovation while preserving financial stability”, 18
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (2017), 47–58.
14. For a discussion, finding no evidence for a regulatory capital-induced trade-off, see
Stewart, Chowdhury and Arjoon, “Bank stability and economic growth: Trade-offs or
opportunities?”, (2020) Empirical Economics, available at <doi.org/10.1007/s00181-020-
01886-4>.
15. “[F]inancial stability has become a key issue and objective in modern financial
regulation aiming to do things better in terms of risk management than individual banks can do
even when properly managed and not tempted by short term benefits”, Dalhuisen, op. cit. supra
note 10, p. 596.
16. V. Mak, “The ‘average consumer’ of EU law in domestic and European litigation” in
Leczykiewicz and Weatherill (Eds.), The Involvement of EU Law in Private Law Relationships
(Hart, 2013), pp. 333–356, at p. 342.
17. Ibid.
18. See the UK House of Lords’ case Three Rivers District Council v. Governor and
Company of The Bank of England, [2001] UKHL 16; Case C-222/02, Peter Paul,
EU:C:2004:606, and again, applying those two precedents, in the Court of Appeal’s case of
Poole v. HM Treasury, [2007] EWCA Civ 1021.
19. Tison, “Do not attack the watchdog! Banking supervisor’s liability after Peter Paul”, 42
CML Rev. (2005), 639–675.
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the protection of investors20 and consumers.21 On the other hand – and this is
the more specific focus of this contribution – private law, after having
undertaken the function of promoting consumer protection, began to perform
the function of improving financial stability. This instrumentalization22 gives
rise to tensions: firstly, the emphasis on stability is likely to conflict with other
predominant principles and aims in private law. Secondly, as stability needs to
be balanced with those other values, it is theoretically possible that the
emergence of a new goal might unexpectedly lead to a decrease of consumer
protection. As an example of the kind of tensions in private law: would it be
possible or desirable to limit the rights of retail investors to avert the possibly
destabilizing effects of invalidating a large number of onerous contracts which
might subvert the stability of systemically important banks and consequently
of the financial system? If the answer to that question is negative, then stability
might be in need of being preserved in other ways: by way of simplification,
possibly either by bail-outs, which will nonetheless stretch the boundaries of
State aid law, or bail-ins23 which might theoretically produce tensions with
depositor protection. Even capital requirements24 might conflict with
shareholders rights. In either case, although the debate around stability has
mostly focused on its public international and supranational role, the private
law dimension appears to be inextricably linked to stability and in need of
specific consideration. This necessitates a more careful examination of the
way in which the goal of stability unfolds in private law in its comparative and
constitutional dimension. The way in which possible conflicts are solved
appears to be ambivalent: it will be shown that financial stability is capable of
sacrificing the interests of certain economic players but not necessarily others.
The pressure placed by the aim of stability on private law is also being
addressed through reforms aimed at a more explicit alignment of consumer
20. Garicano and Lastra, “Towards a new architecture for financial stability: Seven
principles”, 13 Journal of International Economic Law (2010), 597–621, at 599.
21. On investors and consumers, see Cartwright, Banks, Consumers and Regulation (Hart,
2004), p. 4.
22. On private law instrumentalization, see Schmid, Die Instrumentalisierung des
Privatrechts durch die Europäische Union. Privatrecht und Privatrechtskonzeptionen in der
Entwicklung der Europäischen Integrationsverfassung (Nomos, 2010).
23. Bail-ins, however, do not remove the possibility of a bail-out. See Avgouleas and
Goodhart, “Critical reflections on bank bail-ins”, 1 Journal of Financial Regulation (2015),
3–29.
24. A comprehensive analysis of bank capital requirements is beyond the scope of this
article. Generally, capital is considered to contribute to financial stability, though this needs to
be seen in light of the regulatory environment: “the impact of capital on systemic risk is less
pronounced for banks located in countries with better public and private monitoring of financial
institutions and in countries with higher levels of information availability”, see Anginer,
Demirgüç-Kunt and Mare, “Bank capital, institutional environment and systemic stability”, 37
Journal of Financial Stability (2018), 97–106, at 104.
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protection with financial stability. Against this background, the legal
significance of financial stability appears to be less clear than the constant
references to it might suggest.
To illustrate these points, the article looks at European private law broadly
understood and in its constitutional dimension, focusing on the developments
at the international level and more specifically at the law of the European
institutions25 in their interactions with national laws. The article presents the
topic as an increasingly convoluted one, as it starts by depicting a coherent and
relatively linear evolution of financial stability as an international policy, and
then goes on to consider its intersections with private law, problematizing and
dissecting the former by highlighting the tensions that it generates in the latter.
The article is structured as follows: section two will provide a short but
necessary introductory overview of the development of financial stability in
its international and EU frameworks, focusing on its links to the objective of
investor protection in financial regulation; section three will focus on how
those developments have a bearing on private law, discussing how this is
instrumentalized in light of financial stability; section four critically considers
the question of the tensions between financial stability and other values of
private law, looking at the case law of European courts; section five considers
the wider implications of a trade-off between different objectives. The
conclusion summarizes the main points: since private law cannot aim only at
achieving financial stability, as it is also functional to the pursuit of other
public policy objectives, it becomes a battlefield for new conflicts and
balancing of interests.
2. Consumer protection as an objective of financial regulation
While financial regulators have traditionally envisaged their objective as one
of ensuring the integrity of the financial market,26 the notion of stability has
been more often associated to price or exchange stability.27 The 1966 Segré
25. Although the main focus is on the European Union, this also includes the Council of
Europe and the European Free Trade Association.
26. On market integrity, see McVea, “Supporting market integrity” in Moloney, Ferran and
Payne (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (OUP, 2015), pp. 631–658, at p.
634. Market integrity can be defined as “the extent to which a market operates in a manner that
is, and is perceived to be, fair and orderly and where effective rules are in place and enforced by
regulators so that confidence and participation in the market is fostered”. OICV-IOSCO,
Consultation Report “Regulatory issues raised by the impact of technological changes on
market integrity and efficiency”, July 2011, p. 8.
27. See e.g. the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Art. IV.
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Report28 already referred to stability mainly as stability of exchange rates and
prices, and the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact again understood it largely as
price stability, regarding sound public finances as a means to that primary
end.29 As the financialized economy became preponderant over the years, the
goal of ensuring financial stability also by way of enhanced investor
protection started emerging more forcefully,30 particularly so in the 1990s.31
A “twofold approach”, aimed at ensuring both investor protection and
financial stability, developed. The 1993 Investment Services Directive,32
while maintaining a low regulatory profile, insisted on the need for
authorization “in order to protect investors and the stability of the financial
system”.33 Those efforts were reinvigorated after the GFC, when the G20
Summit of 2009 took the decision of to institutionalize the Financial Stability
Forum, establishing the Financial Stability Board.34 The 2009 de Larosière
report35 suggested the reorganization of the EU system of financial
supervision to improve the stability of both individual firms and of the
financial system as a whole.36 Efforts were directed not only at ensuring the
financial stability of countries, but of their financial sectors as well: ensuring
the stability of the euro area is declared as the very first commitment of the
contracting parties in the 2012 Treaty establishing the European Stability
Mechanism, but also inspires the powers of the newly created European
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA),37 the European Banking
28. Commission, “The development of a European capital market. Report of a Group of
Experts appointed by the EEC Commission”, Brussels, Nov. 1966.
29. Tuori and Tuori, op. cit. supra note 5, p. 132.
30. For an overview of this development, see Lo Schiavo, op. cit. supra note 4.
31. See the public lecture given at the London School of Economics on 18 Nov. 1993 by then
Governor of the Bank of England, Edward George, “The pursuit of financial stability”, available
at <www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/quarterly-bulletin/1994/the-pursuit-of-finan
cial-stability.pdf>.
32. Council Directive 93/22/EEC on investment services in the securities field, O.J. 1993, L
141.
33. Ibid., Recital 2.
34. See Carrasco, “The global financial crisis and the financial stability forum: The
awakening and transformation of an international body”, 19 Transnational Law &
Contemporary Problems (2010), 203–220. International monetary and financial law remain
characterized by a largely informal institutional structure, see Lastra, “Do we need a world
financial organization?”, 17 Journal of International Economic Law (2014), 787–805.
35. The high-level group on financial supervision in the EU, chaired by Jacques de
Larosière, Report (Brussels, 25 Feb. 2009).
36. On the evolution of EU law in this area, Marcacci,Regulating Investor Protection under
EU Law. The Unbridgeable Gaps with the U.S. and the Way Forward (Palgrave, 2015).
37. Regulation (EU) 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council establishing a
European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending
Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC, O.J. 2010, L
331/84.
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Authority(EBA),38 and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Authority (EIOPA)39 – all parts of the so-called European System of Financial
Supervision.
While the importance of protecting investors in order to avoid destabilizing
macroeconomic effects has long been recognized,40 the linkage between
financial stability and consumer protection became more evident, though not
necessarily clearer, in post-crisis legislation. ESMA41 is tasked with both
long-term stability of the financial system and enhancing consumer
protection.42 Even in countries which have opted for an institutional design
that keeps them separated,43 consumer protection, integrity, and stability do
end up being substantively interlinked. In the UK – a notable example of a
country which changed approach after the GFC – the Prudential Regulation
Authority (PRA) must promote the soundness of regulated firms, ensuring
that their business is carried out “in a way which avoids any adverse effect on
the stability of the UK financial system”, while the Financial Conduct
Authority (FCA) aims at consumer protection, integrity, and competition. The
law nonetheless clarifies that “[t]he ‘integrity’ of the UK financial system
includes (a) its soundness, stability and resilience”.44 On the other side of the
Atlantic, the US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was created
after the GFC to ensure that consumer debt products are safe and transparent,
and was given extensive rule-making and enforcement powers.45 Even within
38. Regulation (EU) 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing
a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No
716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC, O.J. 2010, L 331/12.
39. Regulation (EU) 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing
a European SupervisoryAuthority (European Insurance and Occupational PensionsAuthority),
amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC, O.J.
2010, L 331/48.
40. On the US: Skeel, Icarus in the Boardroom. The Fundamental Flaws in Corporate
America and where they came from (OUP, 2006), p. 7; Poser, “Why the SEC failed: Regulators
against regulation”, 3 Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law (2009),
289–324, at 290.
41. On the novel consumer protection mandate of the ESMA, see Moloney, The Age of
ESMA. Governing EU Financial Markets (Bloomsbury/Hart, 2018), p. 232.
42. Regulation 1095/2010, cited supra note 37, Art. 1(5).
43. For an overview predating the reform of the supervisory system in the EU and the UK,
Keßler, Micklitz and Reich (Eds.), Institutionelle Finanzmarktaufsicht und Verbraucherschutz,
Eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung der Regelungssysteme in Deutschland, Italien,
Schweden, demVereinigten Königreich und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Nomos, 2010).
44. Financial Services and Markets Act, Part 1A, Chapter 1, 1D.
45. Levitin, “The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An introduction”, 32 Review of
Banking & Financial Law (2012), 321–369.
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complex regulatory infrastructures, forms of cooperation between agencies
with different mandates can then be established.46
In order to achieve their statutory objectives, all the mentioned authorities
are given powers which have an impact on the contracts that private parties
conclude. Probably the most spectacular example of this is represented by the
FCA’s intervention in the area of high-cost short-term credit,47 while ESMA48
temporarily restricted the marketing, distribution or sale of the notoriously
complex and risky49 contracts for difference to retail investors.50 In this sense,
financial stability converges with the objective of enhancing financial market
integrity.51 The link is corroborated by the Court of Justice, which couples the
power of imposing limits on the freedom to enter into certain transactions with
“the pursuit of the objective of financial stability within the Union”.52
While these authorities offer a recent example of the interrelation of those
objectives, it has been accepted for a long time that securities regulation
should aim both at investors protection and stability of the financial system.53
In the literature it can thus be concluded that “[t]he notion of investor
protection is now infused with wider financial stability concerns”,54 while in
American scholarship some suggest that consumer financial protection itself
46. In the US: 2011 Memorandum of Understanding (Information-Sharing MOU) between
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), the Conference of State Bank Supervisors
(CSBS), and various State financial regulatory authorities (State Regulators); and 2013
CFPB-State Supervisory Coordination Framework CFPB and CSBS, on behalf of the State
Regulators. With proposals for a further formalization of that system of coordination, see
Odinet, Foreclosed. Mortgage Servicing and the Hidden Architecture of Homeownership in
America (Cambridge University Press, 2019), p. 109. In the UK: Memorandum of
Understanding between the Financial Conduct Authority and the Bank of England, including
the Prudential Regulation Authority, 2019.
47. FCA, CONC Consumer credit sourcebook, 5A.2.3.
48. On the significance for the centralization of supervisory powers in the EU, see Howell,
“The Evolution of ESMA and direct supervision: Are there implications for EU supervisory
governance?”, 54 CML Rev. (2017), 1027–1058.
49. The issue has been indirectly addressed by A.G. Tanchev in Case C-208/18, Jana
Petruchová, EU:C:2019:314, concerning the qualification as a “consumer” of a retail investor.
50. ESMA Decision 2018/796, and renewals.
51. Recital 11: “The Authority should protect public values such as the integrity and
stability of the financial system, the transparency of markets and financial products and the
protection of investors”.
52. Case C-270/12, UK v. EU (ESMA), EU:C:2014:18, para 85.
53. Goodhart, Hartmann, Llewellyn, Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod, Financial Regulation:
Why, How andWhere Now? (Routledge, 1998), p. 2.
54. Andenas and Chiu, The Foundations and Future of Financial Regulation. Governance
for Responsibility (Routledge, 2014), p. 136.
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should “serve a role not only in protecting individuals from excessive risk, but
also in protecting markets from systemic risk”.55
3. Consumer protection as an instrument of financial stability
Despite the distinction between the domains, private law and financial
regulation do not exist in isolation from one another,56 as the former
complements the provisions of the latter.57 This can be seen if we consider
how the violation of rules of conduct may trigger civil law remedies: current
practices suggest divergent approaches ranging from separation to different
degrees of hybridization,58 whereby courts – and Alternative Dispute
Resolution59 – can look at financial regulation to establish rights and duties
which have been infringed and grant remedies to private parties.60 The ECJ
recognized the possibility of reinforcing the system established by MiFID II61
– which declares in its recitals the twofold objective of protecting both
investors and financial stability – with civil remedies, even if such forms of
interaction raised concerns about the achieved degree of harmonization.62
This reflects in a certain complementarity of the activities of regulatory
agencies and civil courts: in comparison, it can be noted how after the US
Supreme Court controversially held that there is no civil liability under the
Securities Exchange Act for aiding and abetting another person’s
55. Gerding, “The subprime crisis and the link between consumer financial protection and
systemic risk”, (2009) FIU Law Review, 93–122, at 93.
56. Cherednychenko, “Private law discourse and scholarship in the wake of the
Europeanisation of private law” in Devenney and Kenny (Eds.), The Transformation of
European Private Law. Harmonisation, Consolidation, Codification or Chaos? (Cambridge
University Press, 2013), pp. 148–171, at 158.
57. In times of crisis, private law performs the function of managing the fall-outs from
crisis, see Bridge and Braithwaite, “Private law and financial crises”, 13 Journal of Corporate
Law Studies (2013), 361–399.
58. See Cherednychenko, “Contract governance in the EU: Conceptualising the
relationship between investor protection regulation and private law”, 21 ELJ (2015), 500–520.
59. In the UK, see R (on the application of the British Bankers’ Association (BBA)) v.
Financial Services Authority (FSA), [2011] EWHC 999 (Admin).
60. Busch, “Why MiFID matters to private law: The example of MiFID’s impact on asset
manager’s civil liability”, 7 Capital Markets Law Journal (2012), 386–413; Della Negra,
MiFID II and Private Law: Enforcing EUConduct of Business Rules (Bloomsbury/Hart, 2019).
61. Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on markets in
financial instruments (MiFID II), O.J. 2014, L 173.
62. Case C-604/11, Genil v. Bankinter, EU:C:2013:344. Tison, “De bescherming van de
belegger in het kapitaalmarktrecht: De hobbelige weg naar een Europees ius commune”,
Working Paper 2008-07, Financial Law Institute, Ghent University.
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misrepresentation,63 the law was reformed to allow the Securities and
Exchange Commission, rather than private parties, to bring actions in those
situations.64
In addition to these well-known complementary functions, contract law can
also be framed in a way which is functional to the pursuit of financial stability.
This is immediately true for sovereign bond contracts, which can be regulated
so as to achieve a “more sustainable sovereign debt financing”.65 The same
nonetheless increasingly applies to B2C transactions, where regulation takes
into account the goal of promoting stability besides that of consumer
protection. In other words, while the objectives attributed to regulatory bodies
address consumer protection as an “end”, one can point to the emergence in
private law of consumer protection as a “means” to financial stability. If
financial stability is a broad objective which, inspiring different areas of EU
law, can be pursued by different institutions66 and through various
instruments,67 then EU private law is exposed to its influence too. The
two-fold approach now appears in relation to innovations in European
contract law, where consumer protection coexists with the protection of the
system more broadly.68 It is possible to speak in this sense of a new
instrumentalization of private law in general, and consumer protection in
particular. It has been suggested with regard to the reforms promoted at the
international level by the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD, and
particularly aimed at promoting consumers’ financial literacy, that “an
adequate and efficient regulatory framework of consumer protection is one of
the necessary prerequisites for global financial stability”.69
More in particular, and on the basis of the consideration that “[c]onsumer
confidence and trust in a well-functioning market for financial services
promotes financial stability, growth, efficiency and innovation over the long
63. Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994).
64. Gevurtz, “The protection of minority investors and compensation of their losses”, 62
AJCL (2014), 303–331, at 324.
65. Alexander, “Regulating sovereign bond contracts in Europe” in Grundmann, Möslein
and Riesenhuber (Eds.), Contract Governance: Dimensions in Law and Interdisciplinary
Research (OUP, 2015), pp. 451–460.
66. On the ECB’s secondary financial stability mandate, see Psaroudakis, “The scope of
financial stability considerations in the fulfilment of the mandate of the ECB/Eurosystem”, 4
Journal of Financial Regulation (2018), 119–156.
67. Lo Schiavo, op. cit. supra note 4, p. 43.
68. Pagliantini, “Statuto dell’informazione e prestito responsabile nella direttiva
17/2014/UE” in Sirena (Ed.), I mutui ipotecari nel diritto comparato ed europeo. Commentario
alla direttiva 2014/17/UE (Gruppo 24 Ore, 2015), pp. 27–38.
69. Durovic and Micklitz, Internationalization of Consumer Law: A Game Changer
(Springer, 2017), p. 8. See OECD, “Financial literacy and consumer protection: Overlooked
aspects of the crisis”, June 2009.
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term”,70 the G20 High-Level Principles on Financial Consumer Protection
encourage fair and equitable treatment, financial education, and responsible
business conduct. Financial consumer protection can thus be strengthened “to
promote growth, enhance financial stability and increase consumer
welfare”.71 This instrumentalization might affect further areas: for instance
private international law can become an instrument of stability, since it can
help relink the global and the local dimensions allowing for a more effective
control of the conduct of businesses.72
The increasing relevance of financial stability for European private law is
best understood in a historical perspective considering the development of
consumer protection in the credit market. The Consumer Credit Directive of
2008 (hereafter: CCD) is a case in point.73 A clash of views as to the level of
protection to be afforded to the consumer led to the adoption of a text which
included a compromise as to the pivotal principle of responsible lending, de
facto turned into a toothless principle of responsible borrowing.74 That
outcome was an illustration of the debate between the possibly opposite poles
of “access” and “protection” in the way in which financial inclusion was
pursued, with the balance being tipped in favour of the former. The awareness
as to the rooting of the GFC in the subprime mortgage market led to a
reconsideration of that compromise, as evidenced by the Mortgage Credit
Directive of 2014 (hereafter: MCD).75 The MCD filled a gap intentionally left
open by the CCD, whose scope did not extend to credit secured on residential
property.76 Unlike the CCD, the MCD made it clear that credit should not be
made available in the case of a negative assessment of the creditworthiness of
70. OECD, “G20 high-level principles on financial consumer protection”, Oct. 2011, p. 4.
71. Benöhr, “Financial Consumer Protection in the Banking Sector: A Comparative and
Empirical Approach”, research supported by the UNCTAD, available at <unctad.org/en/
Pages/DITC/CompetitionLaw/ResearchPartnership/Financial-Consumer-Protection.aspx>.
72. Van der Eem, “Financial stability as a global public good and private international law
as an instrument for its transnational governance – some basic thoughts” in Muir Watt and
Fernández Arroyo (Eds.), Private International Law and Global Governance (OUP, 2014),
pp. 293–300.
73. Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit
agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, O.J. 2008, L 133/66.
74. See Łobocka-Poguntke, The Evolution of EC Consumer Protection in the Field of
Consumer Credit (Peter Lang, 2012). On responsible lending, see Ramsay, “From truth in
lending to responsible lending” in Howells, Janssen and Schulze (Eds.), Information Rights and
Obligations (Ashgate, 2004), pp. 47–66.
75. Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit
agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives
2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) 1093/2010, O.J. 2014, L 60/34.
76. As clarified by the ECJ in Case C-602/10, Volksbank Romania, EU:C:2012:443,
Member States remained free to extend the scope of application of the directive to mortgage
agreements.
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the consumer.77 That difference can be explained on the basis of the need for
higher protection due to the possibly more severe consequences of the
transaction – including the possible loss of one’s home. The recitals explicitly
confirm that some of the considerations behind the move are nonetheless
linked to the different macroeconomic scenario. The adoption of the MCD
was regarded as part of a plan towards a “safe, responsible and
growth-enhancing financial sector in Europe”, as mentioned in the
Commission’s European Financial Stability and Integration Report.78
More significantly, there is a direct link between the Directive and the
above-mentioned new international financial architecture. Recital 58 of the
MCD links the need for appropriate credit checks to the “recommendations of
the Financial Stability Board”. In 2012, the Financial Stability Board in fact
issued its “Principles for sound residential mortgage underwriting practices”,
inspired by the consideration that, because of the interconnectedness of the
international financial system and the practice of securitization, weak
residential mortgage underwriting practices in one country might lead to
global instability; they therefore require better regulation.79 Complementing
the provisions of the new Directive, the EBA issued guidelines on
creditworthiness assessment based on the FSB’s Principles.80 More recently,
the ECJ had the occasion to consider the differences in the approaches to
creditworthiness assessment by the two directives. Confronted with the
question whether Member States could go beyond the requirements of the
CCD and establish that a credit provider can be prohibited by national law
from granting credit in case of a negative assessment, the ECJ answered in the
affirmative noting that, in light of the objective “to ensure market
transparency and stability”, Member States have to ensure appropriate
regulation. In support of this interpretation, the Court mentioned the rules of
the MCD “which was adopted, as is mentioned in recital 3, with regard to
property loans to consumers following the international financial crisis which
showed that irresponsible behaviour by market participants can undermine the
foundations of the financial system” and “demonstrates the desire of the EU
legislature to make creditors accountable” by ensuring that credit is made
available only when the creditworthiness assessment was positive.81 The
77. MCD, Art. 18(5)(a).
78. Commission, “European Financial Stability and Integration Report 2013”,
SWD(2014)170, p. 83 et seq.
79. FSB, “Principles for sound residential mortgage underwriting practices”, April 2012, I.
80. EBA/GL/2015/11,1 June 2015, “Final Report on Guidelines on creditworthiness
assessment”, p. 5.
81. Case C-58/18, Schyns, EU:C:2019:467, para 46.
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international emergence of the financial stability objective apparently puts its
weight on the side of protection.
While creditworthiness assessment has been the object of much attention,
the relevance of financial stability considerations is not limited to it, but
extends to the regulation of the contractual relation after a breach has
occurred. The MCD makes it clear that the principle that creditors should
exercise reasonable forbearance before initiating foreclosure procedures is
due to “the significant consequences for creditors, consumers and potentially
financial stability of foreclosure”.82 While the implications in terms of
consumer protection, as well as for human rights,83 are self-evident, the
importance of limiting foreclosures also reveals a macroeconomic dimension.
Excessive levels of household indebtedness have been highlighted by the IMF
as a concern for financial stability.84 Since then, the idea is promoted by
international institutions85 that over-indebtedness should be counteracted not
only through a preventive approach but even through appropriate curative
procedures. In that vein, the reform of personal insolvency laws86 has
occasionally represented a condition for the assistance of European
institutions to countries in financial trouble in the context of the mechanism of
conditionality87 which now – controversially88 – also underlie the European
Stability Mechanism and the amended EU treaties. In the meantime, in the
context of the wide-ranging plans to build a Capital Markets Union89 and as
82. MCD, Recital 27.
83. Case C-34/13,Kušionová, EU:C:2014:2189. For a critical discussion of the relevance of
fundamental rights in private law, see Collins, “On the (in)compatibility of human rights
discourse and private law” in Micklitz (Ed.), Constitutionalization of European Private Law
(OUP, 2014), pp. 26–60.
84. IMF, “Dealing with Household Debt. World Economic Outlook”, April 2012; IMF,
“Global Financial Stability Report. Is growth at risk?”, Oct. 2017, p. 70.
85. See also, immediately before the outbreak of the global financial crisis, Council of
Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)8.
86. More generally, see Ramsay, Personal Insolvency in the 21st Century. A Comparative
Analysis of the US and Europe (Bloomsbury/Hart, 2019).
87. European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, “The
Economic Adjustment Programme for Ireland”, Occasional Papers 76, at 52; Memorandum of
Understanding between the European Commission acting on behalf of the European Stability
Mechanism and the Hellenic Republic and the Bank of Greece, Aug. 2015, at 18. For a critical
analysis of bankruptcy law reform in Ireland under IMF’s supervision, Spooner, “The
quiet-loud-quiet politics of post-crisis consumer bankruptcy law: The case of Ireland and the
Troika”, 81Modern Law Review (2018), 790–824.
88. See Salomon, “Of austerity, human rights and international institutions”, 21 ELJ
(2015), 521–545.Also Schepel, “The bank, the bond, and the bail-out: On the legal construction
of market discipline in the Eurozone” 44 Journal of Law and Society (2017), 79–98.
89. Commission Communication, “Action plan on building a Capital Markets Union”,
COM(2015)468 final. More recently, Commission Communication “A Capital Markets Union
for people and businesses. New action plan”, COM(2020)590 final.
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part of a package of initiatives to tackle high non-performing loans ratios, the
European Commission also proposed a directive aimed at regulating the
market for non-performing loans, a project which is “essential for ensuring
competition in the banking sector, preserving financial stability and
encouraging lending so as to create jobs and growth within the Union”.90
4. Tensions between private law and financial stability
Considering the developments sketched out in the previous section, it would
appear that the goals of financial stability and consumer protection are
intersecting and mutually reinforcing. On the one hand, financial regulations
give authorities the power to intervene in the market to ensure protection and
stability; on the other hand, private law is taking on the role of ensuring
stability as well as protecting the consumer. The result is an intersection of
financial regulation and private law, whereby financial regulation addresses
consumer protection top-down and private law addresses financial stability
bottom-up. Yet this process reveals more contentious aspects, as it is not
unlikely that the two objectives, rather than benignly standing in harmony, will
end up in conflict.91 As stability requires a more proactive regulatory
framework, consumer protection can be improved but at the same time cannot
be pushed to the point of undermining stability itself.
One example of a possible conflict – in that case solved in favour of stability
– can be found in the new US financial architecture. As mentioned above, the
CFPB has been given considerable powers to pursue consumer protection in
the financial sector, but this might give rise to concerns as to whether
excessive levels of protection can endanger stability. It is therefore established
that the Financial Stability and Oversight Council (FSOC) has the power to set
aside a regulation by the CFPB if two-thirds of the Council conclude that such
regulation would “put the safety and soundness of the United States banking
system or the stability of the financial system of the United States at risk”.92
90. Commission, Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
credit servicers, credit purchasers and the recovery of collateral, COM(2018)135 final
2018/0063 (COD), Recital (2).
91. See Della Negra, op. cit. supra note 60, p. 208.
92. Section 1023 of the Dodd-Frank Act. The structure of this authority and its degree of
independence gave rise to legal challenges, as most clearly and recently seen in the US Supreme
Court case Seila Law LLC v.Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020) of 29
June 2020. It was established, by a majority of conservative justices, that its Director can be
removed by the President of the United States at will.
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While the power has so far never been formally exercised, it has become
politically contentious, as its use has been occasionally alluded to.93
Of course, considering the existence of the various objectives at a more
general level, it could be suggested that, to the extent that it is able to reduce
risks in the market, investor protection will in fact contribute to financial
stability, so that regarding the two goals in EU law as conflicting might be
wrong.94 Nonetheless, at a more specific level which considers private
interactions in concreto rather than regulatory objectives in abstracto, a
conflict might in fact emerge. One can think first of situations in which
compensation adjudicated by civil courts endangers the financial viability of
a systemically important firm, with possibly negative consequences for the
market.95 Even the possibility of increased opportunistic litigation might
represent a risk for the efficiency and stability of markets.96 A possible
conflict between values such as consumer protection and stability – an
expression of the more fundamental one between fairness and utility – must
therefore be considered. But does this tension reside in a question of economic
consequences of the allocation of losses, or is there a more fundamental
incompatibility between the principles which inspire legal rules?
Additionally, it remains to be seen how the principle of private autonomy has
to be construed in light of stability: for instance, should private transactions
which are deleterious for stability be invalidated in the same way in which
anti-competitive agreements are?
To address these questions, it is necessary to start by clearing the field of the
traditional objection based on private autonomy, which is opposed to the very
idea of private law instrumentalization, and according to which public policy
considerations should not play a role in private law adjudication.97 While this
is not the place to engage in that discussion,98 it can simply be assumed that
private law, either through judicial law-making or regulation, is already
93. See Levitin, “CFPB Arbitration rulemaking – and potential FSOC veto”, Credit Slips.
A Discussion on Credit, Finance, and Bankruptcy, 10 July 2017, available at <www.creditslips
.org/creditslips/2017/07/cfpb-arbitration-rulemaking.html> and, on the same blog, Levitin,
“CFPB politics update”, 9 Aug. 2017, available at <www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2017/08/
cfpb-politics-update.html>.
94. Lo Schiavo, op. cit. supra note 4, p. 63.
95. Della Negra, op. cit. supra note 60, p. 208.
96. MacNeil, “Enforcement and sanctioning” in Ferran, Moloney and Payne, op. cit. supra
note 26, pp. 281–306, at p. 293; on this point see also Della Negra, op. cit. supra note 60, p. 16.
97. See Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Harvard University Press, 1995).
98. For a middle-ground position between autonomists and instrumentalists, see Dagan,
“The limited autonomy of private law”, 56 AJCL (2008), 809–834. For a discussion with
reference to EU private law and regulation, see Dagan, “Between regulatory and
autonomy-based private law”, 22 ELJ (2016), 644–658, Hesselink, “Private law, regulation, and
justice”, 22 ELJ (2016), 681–695.
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inspired by economic considerations. This is evident as far as regulatory
interventions in private law are concerned,99 but even in general contract law
as found in civil codifications or in the common law. In this sense, there would
be few theoretical reasons why, having admitted instrumentalization inspired
by, for instance, competition, instrumentalization in light of financial stability
could not also be pursued. The more substantial question rather emerges as to
whether a private law inspired by competition broadly understood is
compatible with financial stability, since already at a general level the two
policies are likely to interfere with one another, occasionally requiring one to
give way to the other. In other words, the question is not whether stability is
compatible with an abstract and pure model of private law entirely based on
autonomy, but with the current model of constitutionalized private law already
inspired by further considerations, including autonomy.
The point related to the compatibility of stability on the one hand, and
further objectives such as competition and consumer protection on the other
hand, is far from being purely academic and is already known in other areas.
Consider, for instance, the State aid law implications of the assistance
provided by States to financial institutions. The coexistence of multiple
regulatory objectives including competition and stability already led the
European Commission to be confronted with a series of difficult trade-offs.100
During the financial crisis, the Commission accepted that assistance to
financial institutions was justified on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU,
pursuant to which aids intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the
economy of a Member State”, “may be considered to be compatible” with the
internal market, and it adopted about 500 decisions101 where assistance was
justified by the overarching need for stability. The legitimacy of such
assistance as intended to counteract the effects of financial crises102 was
confirmed by the ECJ.103 This allowed the injection of 4.5 trillion euros – an
“astonishing” 36.7 per cent of EU GDP compared to the 2 per cent spent in the
99. It is debated whether those interventions pursue one overarching objective or have an
“experimentalist” inspiration. See Svetiev, “The EU’s private law in the regulated sectors:
Competitive market handmaiden or institutional platform?”, 22 ELJ (2016), 659–680.
100. Gray and de Cecco, “Competition, stability and moral hazard: The tension between
financial regulation and State aid control” in Laprévote, Gray and de Cecco (Eds.), Research
Handbook on State Aid in the Banking Sector (Elgar, 2017), pp. 20–53.
101. Nicolaides, “Legal standing of investors in failed banks”, 27 Nov. 2018, available at
<www.lexxion.eu/en/stateaidpost/legal-standing-of-investors-in-failed-banks/>, who notes
that in the last few years, the Commission steadily tightened the rules on State aid to banks.
102. Case C-526/14, Kotnik, EU:C:2016:570, para 49 et seq.
103. Case C-579/16 P,Commission v.FIHHolding and FIHErhversbank, EU:C:2018:159;
Case C-544/17 P, BPC Lux 2 and Others v. Commission, EU:C:2018:880.
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1980s104 – into the banking system: while the tension could be resolved within
the existing legal categories, the economic effect does appear to be
exceptional. Similarly, in international trade law, liberalization proposals
aimed at facilitating global competition can conflict with both stability105 and
consumer protection, as national market regulations oriented towards those
latter objectives constitute otherwise undesired non-tariff barriers to trade. In
order to resolve that tension and permit deviations from the overall goals of
liberalization, while States attempt to export their own regulatory standards to
promote stability and simultaneously enjoy a position of advantage in global
competition,106 the Annex on financial services to the GATS – as well as other
trade and investment agreements – included a prudential “carve-out”. This
allows domestic regulation intended “to ensure the integrity and stability of
the financial system”107 and is currently proving to be “a bastion” against
litigation on financial regulations.108 By the same token, EU law already
developed a “general good” exception to acknowledge some regulatory
powers of the host State on foreign financial services providers. The principle
was present also in the Investment Services Directive, which referred to the
“stability and sound operation of the financial system and the protection of the
investor”109 as considerations included in the exception. However, the
vagueness of the notion posed noticeable problems for harmonization,110 until
MiFID111 – which was designed to eliminate host Member State control to the
104. Chalmers, Davies and Monti, European Union Law, 4th ed. (Cambridge University
Press, 2019), p. 1000.
105. Demirgüc¸-Kunt and Detragiache, “Financial liberalization and financial fragility” in
Pleskovic and Stiglitz (Eds.), Proceedings of the 1998World Bank Conference on Development
Economics (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1999), pp. 303–331,
suggesting that this can be counteracted through the creation of an appropriate regulatory and
supervisory framework; Arner, Financial Stability, Economic Growth and the Role of Law
(Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 262.
106. Davies, “Financial stability and the global influence of EU Law” in Cremona and Scott
(Eds.), EU Law Beyond EU Borders. The Extraterritorial Reach of EU Law (OUP, 2019), pp.
146–173.
107. Annex on financial services, 2(a). On the interpretation of the prudential carve-out,
see WTO Appellate Body in Argentina – Financial Services (2016).
108. This is not to say that conflicts of that kind are resolved within international economic
law. On the contrary, in the last decades there have been numerous disputes on financial
services. See Lupo-Pasini, “Financial disputes in international courts”, 21 Journal of
International Economic Law (2018), 1–30.
109. See Tison, “What is ‘general good’ in EU financial services law?”, 24 LIEI (1997),
1–46.
110. Ortino, “The role and functioning of mutual recognition in the European market of
financial services”, 56 ICLQ (2007), 309–338.
111. Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on markets in
financial instruments, O.J. 2004, L 145, repealed by MiFID II, cited supra note 61.
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greatest extent possible112 – established a more comprehensive model of
regulation of business conduct, thus heavily reducing Member States’
leeway.113
Just as those objectives might possibly clash in State aid law or WTO law,
their incorporation in private law produces tensions. Is financial stability
compatible with the other principles and goals which have been traditionally
pursued by private law, such as competition, pacta sunt servanda, or consumer
protection itself? In the following, it will be shown that the accommodation of
those objectives is possible at the price of a continuous balancing either at the
judicial or at the regulatory level. With regard to the outcome of that process,
a case law analysis shows that the balancing may yield different results
depending on the interests at stake.
4.1. Corporate law and shareholder protection
The aforementioned tensions are evident in areas which are traditionally more
explicitly open to economic considerations, such as corporate law. While
firms are not generally under an obligation to act in a way which preserves
stability, regulation might impose requirements on them aimed at reducing
systemic risk: “corporate governance rules and regulations have become
instruments at the service of financial stability”.114 Also here, however, the
objective is capable of clashing with other principles underlying corporate
law, and with shareholder protection in particular. As important as it is, the
principle of protection of minority shareholders cannot be pushed to the point
of endangering the proper functioning of the corporation: it has been
provokingly noted in the literature that, “given shareholders’ inclination to
short-term profits, and the economy’s need to embed long-term growth and
stability, a governance that excluded shareholder views would seem desirable
– although radical”;115 and empirical research evidences that banks where
executives are more insulated from shareholders are financially stronger.116
112. Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, 3rd ed. (OUP, 2014), p.
398.
113. Colaert, “European banking, securities and insurance law: Cutting through sectoral
lines?”, 52 CML Rev. (2015), 1579–1616, at 1609.
114. Wymeersch, “Corporate governance and financial stability”, Working Paper 2008-11,
p. 4, Financial Law Institute, Ghent University. See also, Fernandes, Farinha and Martins,
“Determinants of European banks’ bailout following the 2007–2008 financial crisis”, 19
Journal of International Economic Law (2016), 707–742, and Kokkinis, Corporate Law and
Financial Instability (Routledge, 2017).
115. Talbot, Critical Company Law (Routledge, 2016), p. 86.
116. Ferreira, Kershaw, Kirchmaier and Schuster, “Measuring management insulation from
shareholder pressure”, ECGI Finance Working Paper No. 345/2013.
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Bank resolution regimes will further need to mediate between shareholder
protection and the proper functioning of the economy.117
This conflict has become visible in the ECJ’s more recent case law, dealing
with situations where the pursuit of stability required measures opposed by
shareholders. Initially, in a series of cases revolving around the interpretation
of the then Second Company Law Directive,118 the ECJ consistently stated
that EU law precludes national laws which, aiming at ensuring the continued
operation of indebted undertakings “which are of particular economic and
social importance for society as a whole”,119 allow for capital to be raised by
means of administrative measures without a resolution by the general
meeting.120 The possibility of derogations from this principle “with the aim of
safeguarding certain vital interests of the Member States which are liable to be
affected in exceptional situations”121 was recognized, but only where EU law
allows so.122
Notably in the 1996 case Pafitis123 (the first on this question where the
defendants were private parties instead of State entities, although the relief
sought was directed against what could be seen as an administrative
measure)124 the Bank of Greece ordered the recapitalization of a commercial
bank and placed it under the temporary supervision of an administrator
appointed to ensure recapitalization. Since the decision to increase capital had
been taken by the administrator without convening the general meeting of
shareholders, a group of shareholders sought the annulment of the decision.
When the national court referred the case to Luxembourg, the ECJ suggested
in clear terms that while “[i]t is true that considerations concerning the need to
protect the interests of savers and, more generally, the equilibrium of the
savings system, require strict supervisory rules in order to ensure the
117. Alexander, “Bank resolution regimes: Balancing prudential regulation and
shareholder rights”, 9 Journal of Corporate Law Studies (2009), 61–93.
118. Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC, O.J. 1977, L 26, now Directive (EU) 2017/1132
of the European Parliament and of the Council relating to certain aspects of company law
(codification), O.J. 2017, L 169. It is important to note that the new rules explicitly allow for
limitations to the prerogatives of the general meeting in the case of use of the resolution tools,
powers and mechanisms provided for in Title IV of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and
resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, O.J. 2014, L 173.
119. Joined Cases C-19 & 20/90, Karella, EU:C:1991:229, para 36.
120. Joined Cases C-19 & 20/90, Karella; Case C-381/89, Syndesmos Melon, EU:C:
1992:142.
121. Joined Cases C-19 & 20/90, Karella, para 27.
122. Ibid., paras. 27 and 28.
123. Case C-441/93, Pafitis, EU:C:1996:92.
124. Stuyck, annotation of Case C-192/94, El Corte Inglés SA v. Cristina Blázquez Rivero,
EU:C:1996:88; Case C-129/94, Rafael Ruiz Bernáldez, EU:C:1996:143; Case C-441/93,
Panagis Pafitis, 33 CML Rev. (1996), 1261–1272, at 1268 and 1270.
Financial stability 409
continuing stability of the banking system”,125 that did not also imply that the
organs of public limited liability companies should be deprived of their
prerogatives. The balance was tipped in favour of the shareholders.
It is crucial to note that in Pafitis, the ECJ did recognize the relevance of
both objectives, but suggested that stability could be achieved without limiting
shareholders’ rights through other mechanisms, such as notably a generalized
scheme to guarantee deposits.126 In fact, Directive 94/19/EC harmonized the
laws of the Member States, making mandatory a scheme to protect deposits
below a certain threshold, with the declared intent of achieving both stability
and investor protection.127 As stressed by the ECJ on another occasion, the
Directive had a “twofold approach” intended “both to protect depositors and
to ensure the stability of the banking system”.128 In the literature too it is
suggested that, for various reasons, deposit protection does contribute to
financial stability.129 Nevertheless, and leaving aside economic empirical
evidence suggesting that in fact depositor protection funds are generally
correlated with increased banking instability,130 later events showed that even
that mechanism might not be sufficient to fulfil both objectives at the same
time.131 As mentioned by the EFTA Court interpreting that Directive in the
context of the collapse of Landsbanki and answering in the negative the
question whether Iceland was liable to harmed international investors not
fully covered by the scheme, “the funding obligation imposed on the members
of a guarantee scheme is limited under the Directive and must not be too
onerous in order not to jeopardize the stability of the banking system”.132
Given these problematic aspects, which also led to the necessity of upgrading
125. Case C-441/93, Pafitis, para 49.
126. Ibid., para 51.
127. On compensation and depositor protection schemes, see Cartwright, op. cit. supra note
21, p. 189.
128. Case C-571/16,Kantarev, EU:C:2018:807, para 56. The ECJ brought those objectives
within the realm of the internal market competence, Case C-233/94, Germany v. European
Parliament and Council, EU:C:1997:231, para 15.
129. Kleftouri, “Meeting the rationale of deposit protection system”, 22 Journal of
Financial Regulation and Compliance (2014), 300–417; Kleftouri, Deposit Protection and
Bank Resolution (OUP, 2015), p. 9.
130. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, “Does deposit insurance increase banking system
stability? An empirical investigation”, 49 Journal of Monetary Economics (2002), 1373–1406.
Nonetheless, the study suggests that this negative effect will not be produced in countries with
a “very good” institutional environment.
131. Kleftouri (2015), op. cit. supra note 129, p. 24, on the role and limitations of the UK
Financial Services Compensation Scheme and suggesting that “the goals of financial stability
and depositor protection need to be viewed as highly interconnected”.
132. EFTA Court, Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland, para 173.
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the Directive,133 as well as to a proposal for the creation of a European Deposit
Insurance Scheme as the third pillar of the Banking Union,134 there seem to be
limits to what protection schemes alone can achieve as a safety net envisaging
both stability and investor protection.
In the wake of the financial crisis – which, it is suggested, “immensely”135
affected the established case law of supranational courts – measures aimed at
stabilizing the market led to a surge of cases, forcing the ECJ to re-engage with
its jurisprudence. Famously in Kotnik136 – involving burden-sharing and
having a plurality of implications both for State aid and private law137 – the
Grand Chamber of the ECJ accepted that “the objective of ensuring
the stability of the financial system while avoiding excessive public spending
and minimizing distortions of competition constitutes an overriding public
interest”138 which is capable of trumping other considerations. Rejecting the
argument that, following the Court’s own precedents, the approval of a general
meeting of the company was necessary, the Court distinguished its previous
case law explaining that those earlier cases concerned “the insolvency of a
single bank”, while the present situation involved the “prerequisite for the
grant, to banks faced with a capital shortfall, of State aid intended, in an
exceptional context of a national economy being affected by a serious
disturbance, to overcome a systemic financial crisis capable of adversely
affecting the national financial system as a whole and the financial stability of
the European Union”.139 The Court explicitly acknowledged that the previous
cases had been decided in a different era, i.e. before the third stage of the
133. Directive 94/19/EC, amended by Directive 2009/14/EC, was repealed by Directive
2014/49/EU, O.J. 2014, L 173/149. Payne, “The reform of Deposit Guarantee Schemes in
Europe” 12 European Company and Financial Law Review (2015), 539–562.
134. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance
Scheme, COM(2015)586 final – 2015/0270 (COD). See also Carmassi, Dobkowitz, Evrard,
Parisi, Silva and Wedow, “Completing the Banking Union with a European Deposit Insurance
Scheme: Who is afraid of cross-subsidisation?”, European Central Bank, Occasional Paper
Series, No 208, April 2018; Arnaboldi, Risk and Regulation in Euro Area Banks. Completing
the Banking Union (Springer, 2019), pp. 109–122.
135. Gerapetritis, New Economic Constitutionalism in Europe (Hart, 2019), p. 189.
136. Case C-526/14, Kotnik, EU:C:2016:767.
137. Badenhoop, “Banking communication non-binding and burden-sharing approved:
Kotnik”, 13 European Review of Contract Law (2017), 299–309.
138. Case C-526/14, Kotnik, para 69.
139. Ibid., para 90.At para 93, the ECJ also clarified that the fact that the new bank recovery
and resolution regime introduced, from 1 Jan. 2016, derogations from the principle that any
increase in capital must be decided upon by the general meeting “does not permit the conclusion
that, before that date, derogations of that kind were prohibited”.
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implementation of the Economic and Monetary Union. Reforms have now
raised stability to a level which allows it to trump shareholder rights. Hence,
“although there is a clear public interest in ensuring throughout the European
Union a strong and consistent protection of investors, that interest cannot be
held to prevail in all circumstances over the public interest in ensuring the
stability of the financial system”.140
This line of reasoning was confirmed in Dowling.141 The case involved the
exceptional general meeting of a bank rejecting the instruction received by the
Central Bank of Ireland to recapitalize the company, and the consequent
direction order issued by the High Court to increase capital. The ECJ
confirmed that it is possible to circumvent the need for a general meeting
“where there is a serious disturbance of the economy and the financial system
of a Member State threatening the financial stability of the European
Union”;142 it insisted that this finding was “in no way irreconcilable”143 with
Pafitis, as the facts of that case allegedly did not reveal a systemic risk
dimension. A distinction is therefore confirmed between “ordinary
reorganization measures” and “extraordinary reorganization measures, such
as a direction order designed to avoid, in a situation where there is a serious
disturbance of the national economy and of the financial system of a Member
State, the failure of a bank and thereby to maintain the financial stability of the
European Union”.144 In both sets of cases, the tension between shareholder
protection and stability was acknowledged, but different outcomes were
reached, based on the recognition of the existence of a systemic risk.
In the final analysis, the principle of minority shareholders’ protection
remains a relatively weak one. Addressing the question whether there is such
a general principle in EU law, the ECJ had already clarified in Audiolux that
that objective simply cannot be considered a general principle of EU law.145
As minority shareholder protection is not the first candidate to become a
constitutional principle and can at most be a general principle of corporate
law,146 it is clear that when contrasted to the goal of financial stability rooted
in the Treaties and underlying bank insolvency reforms, it is very likely to be
a secondary consideration.
140. Ibid., para 91.
141. Case C-41/15, Dowling, EU:C:2016:836.
142. Ibid., para 55.
143. Ibid., para 53.
144. Ibid.
145. Case C-101/08, Audiolux, EU:C:2009:626, para 63.
146. Hesselink, “The general principles of civil law: Their nature, roles and legitimacy” in
Leczykiewicz and Weatherill, op. cit. supra note 16, pp. 131–180.
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4.2. Property law and investment protection
Limitations to shareholders rights might be necessary to ensure stability. And
yet, such an approach puts pressure not only on corporate governance, but also
on property law. If financial stability considerations can trump the principles
governing the ordinary functioning of corporations, including shareholder
protection, which does not enjoy a form of recognition as a
quasi-constitutional principle, the question emerges as to whether they can
also prevail over property rights, which on the contrary do enjoy such a
constitutional status. Notably pursuant to the case law of the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR),147 corporate shares constitute “possession” in the
sense of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ECHR.148 As shareholders’ rights amount
to rights to property under the Convention,149 illegal administrative actions
causing a loss to shareholders might lead to a violation of the Convention.
Article 1(2) and the case law of the ECtHR, nonetheless, famously accept
proportionate limitations to that right in light of the general interest. What is
more, with regard to the austerity measures150 implemented in various
countries,151 the ECtHR insisted both on the wide margin of appreciation
acknowledged to the States and on the “the existence of an exceptional crisis
without precedent”152 in order to allow States to reduce salaries and retirement
pensions of public servants, accepting that proportionate153 measures adopted
in the pursuit of the stability of public finances were legitimately taken in the
147. See Council of Europe/ECtHR, “Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European
Convention on Human Rights. Protection of property”, 30 April 2020. For an academic analysis
from the UK perspective, see Allen, Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (Hart, 2005),
p. 83.
148. ECtHR, Olczak v. Poland, Appl. No. 30417/96, judgment of 7 Nov. 2002; ECtHR,
Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, Appl. No. 48553/99, judgment of 25 July 2002; ECtHR,
Shesti Mai Engineering OOD and Others v. Bulgaria, Appl. No. 17854/04, judgment of 20
Sept. 2011; ECtHR, Reisner v. Turkey, Appl. No. 46815/09, judgment of 1 Dec. 2016; ECtHR,
Knick v. Turkey, Appl. No. 53138/09, judgment of 12 June 2018.
149. Alexander, op. cit. supra note 8, p. 153.
150. For a critical analysis, see Pervou, “Human rights in times of crisis: The Greek cases
before the ECtHR, or the polarisation of a democratic society”, 5Cambridge International Law
Journal (2016), 113–138.
151. ECtHR, Valkov and Others v. Bulgaria, Appl. Nos. 2033/04, 19125/04, 19475/04,
19490/04, 19495/04, 19497/04, 24729/04, 171/05 and 2041/05, judgment of 25 Oct. 2011;
ECtHR Panfile v. Romania, Appl. No. 13902/11, judgment of 20 March 2012; ECtHR,Koufaki
and Adedy v. Greece, Appl. Nos. 57665/12 and 57657/12, judgment of 7 May 2013; ECtHR,
Da Conceição Mateus v. Portugal and Santos Januário v. Portugal, Appl. Nos. 62235/12 and
57725/12, judgment of 8 Oct. 2013.
152. ECtHR, Koufaki, para 37.
153. In ECtHR, N.K.M. v. Hungary, Appl. No. 66529/11, judgment of 14 May 2013, the
ECtHR ruled that a 98% tax on part of the severance pay of a civil servant constituted a violation
of the ECHR.
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public interest.154 This is relevant for the banking sector, and the events
surrounding the collapse of the British bank Northern Rock are significant:
the complaints about the alleged violation of investors’ property rights
following the nationalization and liquidation of the bank were unsuccessful in
the UK. Those measures, it was recognized by the Court of Appeal, were
intended to safeguard financial stability.155 When the dispute reached the
ECtHR,156 the Court dismissed the case, finding the complaint as to a
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 manifestly ill-founded.157 As
summarized in the literature, as long as the measure is taken lawfully and in
the public interest, those complaints in the context of a financial crisis “are
unlikely to be viewed sympathetically” by the courts.158
In the case law of the ECJ, where references to the right of property are read
in light of Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR), the
approach taken in Kotnik rejects the argument that burden-sharing measures
such as those laid down in the Banking Communication159 constitute
interference in the right to property of shareholders and subordinated
creditors160 even if, as has been highlighted, the Court does so at the price of
some circularity in its reasoning161 and of a strong reliance on the
no-creditor-worse-off principle.162 A more explicit engagement with property
law aspects came two months after that decision. In the Ledra Advertising
case,163 which concerned the Memorandum of Understanding between
Cyprus and the Troika (Commission, ECB, IMF) establishing that depositors
would bear part of the burden, the ECJ concluded that while the Commission
was bound by the respect of the right to property even when signing the
154. ECtHR, Koufaki and Adedy v. Greece, Appl. Nos. 57665/12 and 57657/12,
paras. 36–41.
155. SRM Global Master Fund LP v. Treasury Commissioners, [2009] EWCA Civ 788.
156. For an overview of the different stages of the dispute, see Qureshi and Nicol,
“Protection of shareholders under the European Convention of Human Rights and the ‘margin
of appreciation’”, 28Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law (2013),
135–137.
157. ECtHR,Grainger v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 34940/10, judgment of 10 July 2012.
158. Cranston, Avgouleas, Van Zwieten, Hare and Van Sante, Principles of Banking Law,
3rd ed. (OUP, 2018), p. 178.
159. Commission Communication on the application, from 1 Aug. 2013, of State aid rules
to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (Banking
Communication), O.J. 2013, C 216/1.
160. Case C-526/14, Kotnik, para 79.
161. Gargantini, “Procedure di risoluzione bancarie: tutela della proprietà e dell’equo
processo” in Caggia and Resta (Eds.), I diritti fondamentali in Europa e il diritto privato (Roma
Tre Press, 2019), pp. 213–272, at 246.
162. Fucile, “Resolution framework and the protection of fundamental rights” in Lo
Schiavo (Ed.), The European Banking Union and the Role of Law (Elgar, 2019), pp. 259–272,
at 268.
163. Joined Cases C-8–10/15 P, Ledra Advertising, EU:C:2016:701.
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Memorandum, that right is not absolute and proportionate limitations to it are
justified.
The fact that limitations to the right to property are possible is of course not
new, and is found in the civil as well as constitutional traditions of many
countries which accept that property should serve a social function. In the
European Communities, this was already accepted in the 1970s, when the ECJ
recognized that rights of ownership, “far from constituting unfettered
prerogatives, must be viewed in the light of the social function of the property
and activities protected thereunder”, so that “it likewise seems legitimate that
these rights should, if necessary, be subject to certain limits justified by the
overall objectives pursued by the Community, on condition that the substance
of these rights is left untouched”.164 The approach was followed in several
other instances.165 In Ledra Advertising, the Court developed that
jurisprudence, now explicitly qualifying the pursuit of financial stability as an
objective of the EU. As the ECJ concluded, limitations to that right are
justified “[i]n view of the objective of ensuring the stability of the banking
system in the euro area, and having regard to the imminent risk of financial
losses to which depositors with the two banks concerned would have been
exposed if the latter had failed”.166 Following LedraAdvertising, the ECJ later
dismissed the action for damages against the EU for a possible infringement of
the right to property of depositors and shareholders following the
restructuring of Cypriot banks.167
Similarly, the Italian Constitutional Court168 in 2018 found no violation of
the right to property, as protected both by the Italian Constitution and
supranational law, by a reform of Italian banking legislation.169 In order to
increase the stability of the system, the reform required the transformation of
larger cooperative banks into companies limited by shares and, in order to
avoid their undercapitalization, allowed in that case for limitations to the
redemption of shares held by withdrawing shareholders. The question arose
whether this amounted in practice to an expropriation rather than merely a
164. Case C-4/73, Nold, EU:C:1974:51, para 14.
165. See Comparato and Micklitz, “Regulated autonomy between market freedoms and
fundamental rights in the case law of the CJEU” in Bernitz, Groussot and Schulyok (Eds.),
General Principles of EU Law and European Private Law (Kluwer, 2013), pp. 121–153.
166. Joined Cases C-8–10/15 P, Ledra Advertising, para 74.
167. Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition) in Case
T-680/13, Chrysostomides, K. & Co. and Others v. Council and Others, EU:T:2018:486. On
the issue of the alleged violation of the right to property, the judgment of the GC was upheld by
the ECJ Grand Chamber in Joined Cases C-597 & 598/18 P, C-603 & 604/18 P, Council v. K.
Chrysostomides & Co. and Others, EU:C:2020:1028, paras. 154–172.
168. Italian Constitutional Court, judgment of 15 May 2018 No. 99/2018.
169. Art. 1(1)(a), D.L. 24 Jan. 2015, No. 3, converted and amended by Statute of 24 March
2015, No. 33, amending Art. 28(2)2-ter of Legislative Decree No. 385/1993.
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limitation, but the Constitutional Court answered in the negative, concluding
that since limitations are temporary and contingent, the law does not have a
definitive expropriating effect. The Constitutional Court reached the
conclusion both by stressing the harmony between Italian legislation and
the EU legal framework on capital requirements,170 and by referring to the
supranational case law on the subject. Hence, it was established by the
Constitutional Court that measures involving sacrifices for shareholders’ and
creditors’ rights do not amount to a disproportionate and intolerable
interference in the right to property when they pursue the objective of
financial stability.171
The ECJ was later faced with the issue.172 The question was raised whether
Italian legislation was precluded not only by EU rules on capital requirements,
but also by the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property as
protected by the CFR. Relying on its settled case law on the freedom to
conduct a business,173 as well as its later cases from Kotnik to Ledra
Advertising, the ECJ answered the question in the negative, noting that
“according to the Court’s case law, the objectives of ensuring the stability of
the banking and financial system and preventing a systemic risk are objectives
of public interest pursued by the European Union”.174
A further layer to be considered in this context is that of international
investment law, since measures such as the ones discussed so far might amount
to expropriations prohibited under bilateral investment treaties. There have
been instances where international investors have challenged State measures
aimed at stabilizing the banking sector. In those cases, nonetheless, arbitral
tribunals have generally rejected the claims, either relying on the prudential
carve-outs in those agreements or even, when such provisions were lacking,
acknowledging the existence of reasonable regulatory powers of the State.175
170. Regulation (EU) 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation
(EU) 648/2012, O.J. 2013, L 176, and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 241/2014
supplementing Regulation (EU) 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with
regard to regulatory technical standards for Own Funds requirements for institutions, O.J. 2014,
L 74.
171. Italian Constitutional Court, judgment of 15 May 2018, No. 99/2018, para 5.6.
172. Case C-686/18, Adusbef and Others, EU:C:2020:567.
173. Case C-283/11, Sky Österreich, EU:C:2013:28.
174. Case C-686/18, Adusbef, para 92.
175. With references to several cases, see Mitchell, Hawkins and Mishra, “Dear Prudence:
Allowances under international trade and investment law for prudential regulation in the
financial services sector”, 19 Journal of International Economic Law (2016), 787–820, at 798.
See also Mersch, Achtouk-Spivak, Affaki, Contartese and Vidal Puig, “The new challenges
raised by investment arbitration for the EU legal order”, European Central Bank, Legal
Working Paper Series No. 19, Oct. 2019.
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Despite these continuous references to financial stability as a justification
for interferences with property rights, it must be noted that courts are not
prepared to legitimize each and every measure which purportedly aims at
stability. On the contrary, national courts have already declared the illegality
of various austerity measures when these curtailed socio-economic rights176
and when they aimed at reducing public debt through privatization.177 Judicial
reasoning, however, was generally not based on the right to property alone, but
involved further considerations such as – notably but not exclusively178 – the
principle of equality and social rights as laid down in constitutions.179
Paradigmatically, in Portugal180 – the country which offered the “most serious
legal challenge to the austerity measures”181 – the Constitutional Court in
2012 declared the unconstitutionality of various norms contained in the State
Budget Law which reduced public pensions and public sector workers’
salaries, on the basis of the argument that by affecting certain categories, the
statute disproportionality imposed sacrifices on certain groups of citizens,
thus violating the principle of equality.182 In that instance, the Court
underlined that not even a state of economic emergency can authorize the
legislature to disrespect basic constitutional principles.183 The impact of this
and following sensitive rulings along the same lines by the Portuguese
Constitutional Court184 was such that one of the Troika’s new conditions for
176. See Italian Constitutional Court, judgment of 10 March 2015, No. 70/2015.
177. On privatization of water supply in Greece, see the rulings of the Greek Council of
State 1906/2014, 1223/2020 and 1224/2020.
178. Italian Constitutional Court, judgment of 8 Oct. 2012, No. 223/2012, referring to the
principle of judicial independence as being jeopardized by pay cuts for judges.
179. Fasone, “Constitutional courts facing the euro crisis. Italy, Portugal and Spain in a
comparative perspective”, MWP 2014/25, Max Weber Programme, EUI Working Papers. See
the contributions in Kilpatrick and de Witte (Eds.), Social Rights in Times of Crisis in the
Eurozone: The Role of Fundamental Rights’Challenges, EUI Working Papers LAW 2014/05.
180. On the jurisprudence of the Portuguese Constitutional Court on austerity, see Nogueira
de Brito, “Putting social rights in brackets? The Portuguese experience with welfare challenges
in times of crisis” in Kilpatrick and de Witte, ibid. pp. 67–77; Gomes, “Social rights in crisis in
the Eurozone. Work rights in Portugal”, in Kilpatrick and de Witte, ibid., pp. 78–84; Cisotta and
Gallo, “The Portuguese Constitutional Court case law on austerity measures: A reappraisal”, in
Kilpatrick and de Witte, ibid., pp. 85–94.
181. Estella, Legal Foundations of EU Economic Governance (Cambridge University
Press, 2018), p. 224.
182. Portuguese Constitutional Court, ruling No. 353/12 of 5 July 2012.
183. On the necessity of maintaining a core of human rights and the rule of law during
economic crises, see Letnar Černič, “The European Court of Human Rights, rule of law and
socio-economic rights in times of crises”, 8 HJRL (2016), 227–247.
184. In particular, Portuguese Constitutional Court rulings Nos. 187/2013, 474/2013, and
862/2013. See Canotilho, Violante and Lanceiro, “Austerity measures under judicial scrutiny:
The Portuguese constitutional case law”, 11 EuConst (2015), 155–183. Discussing also the role
of the government, see Violante, “The Portuguese Constitutional Court and its austerity case
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financial assistance was that Portugal had to “take a number of steps aiming at
mitigating the legal risks from future potential Constitutional Court
rulings”.185
While this evolution is instructive to show the interaction between stability
and the protection of investors, illustrating how the former has gained more
relevance in recent years, it remains to be seen whether the same applies with
regards to the protection of the consumer in contract law. Does financial
stability play the same role when dealing with consumer debts rather than
investments?
4.3. Contract law and consumer protection
Exceptional conditions might justify interventions in existing contracts which
ultimately deprive parties of some of their rights. When, at the peak of the debt
crisis, Greece retroactively imposed Collective Action Clauses (CAC) in the
terms and conditions of Greek-law government bonds in order to enable a
majority of investors to accept a haircut for all bondholders,186 courts dealing
with the complaints of dissatisfied retail investors constantly found against the
claimants. Different national courts187 reached that conclusion either
declaring that by introducing a new term in contracts governed by its domestic
law, Greece had acted iure imperii,188 or by accepting the commercial nature
of the issue but declining jurisdiction on private international law grounds.189
The ECJ, in Kuhn,190 came to the conclusion that for the purposes of Brussels
I Regulation (recast)191 the disputes did not pertain to “civil and commercial
law” in Pinto and Pequito Texeira (Eds.), Political Institutions and Democracy in Portugal.
Assessing the Impact of the Eurocrisis (Springer, 2018), pp. 121–143.
185. European Commission, The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal –
Seventh Review, Winter 2012/2013, Occasional Papers 153, June 2013, Annex 5, 1.28, p. 72.
186. Zettelmeyer, Trebesch, Gulati, Monacelli and Whelan, “The Greek debt restructuring:
An autopsy”, 28 Economic Policy (2013), 513–563.
187. For a comprehensive analysis of the German cases on Greek bonds, revealing some
differences in the approaches of various courts, see Grund, “The legal consequences of
sovereign insolvency – A review of creditor litigation in Germany following the Greek debt
restructuring”, 24 MJ (2017), 399–423.
188. German Federal Supreme Court, No. VI ZR 516/14 of 8 March 2016.
189. Austrian Supreme Court, judgment of 25 Nov. 2015, 8 Ob125/15p. For a comparison
between Germany and Austria, see Grund, “Enforcing sovereign debt in court – A comparative
analysis of litigation and arbitration following the Greek debt restructuring of 2012”, 1
University of Vienna Law Review (2017), 34–90.
190. Case C-308/17, Hellenische Republik v. Leo Kuhn, EU:C:2018:911.
191. Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters,
O.J. 2012, L 351.
CML Rev. 2021418 Comparato
matters”.192 The Court stressed the exceptional nature of the disputed measure
and its macroeconomic background:
“the unprecedented reliance on the retroactive inclusion of a CAC and the
resulting amendment to the financial terms took place in an exceptional
context, in the circumstances of a serious financial crisis. They were
namely dictated by the necessity . . . to restructure the Greek State’s
public debt and to prevent the risk of failure of the restructuring plan of
that debt, to avoid that State failing to pay and to ensure the financial
stability of the euro area”.193
Similarly, the legitimacy of this approach was confirmed by the ECtHR,
which rejected the allegation that the haircut amounted to a violation of the
right to property: the ECtHR found that the measure served a public interest
aim, “à savoir le maintien de la stabilité économique et la restructuration de la
dette, dans l’intérêt général de la communauté”.194
However, this line of cases should not be taken to mean that the existence
of exceptional circumstances will always authorize a State to breach its
contractual obligations. This had already been seen in the Argentinian
bonds saga. Argentina’s argument that paying all its creditors would lead
to further economic crises was rejected by US courts;195 most courts in
192. In that case, the Court reached the opposite conclusion from what it had previously
reached in Case C-226/13, Fahnenbrock and Others v. Hellenische Republik, EU:C:2015:383,
which revolved around the interpretation of the identical formula “civil and commercial
matters”, employed however by Regulation (EC) 1393/2007 on the service in the Member
States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters, O.J. 2007, L
324/79. The same wording was given independent interpretations: on the difference between
the approach in Kuhn and Fahnenbrock, see Opinion of A.G. Bot, in Case C-308/17, Kuhn,
EU:C:2018:528.
193. Case C-308/17, Kuhn, para 40. Nonetheless, as explained by A.G. Szpunar in Case
C-641/18,Rina, EU:C:2020:3, the judgment inKuhn “cannot be understood as meaning that the
general objective of a measure, such as it may be inferred from the context in which it is
adopted, is in itself sufficient support for a finding that it constitutes a manifestation of public
authority” (para 74), but “the circumstance that, in the light of their objective, certain acts are
performed in the public or general interest is, in my opinion, merely an indication that those acts
are performed in the exercise of powers falling outside the scope of the ordinary legal rules
applicable to relationships between private individuals” (para 78).
194. ECtHR, Mamatas and Others v. Greece, Appl. Nos. 63066/14, 64297/14 and
66106/14, judgment of 21 July 2016, para 103. On the significance of the decision, see Belle,
“Mamatas and Others v Greece: How the European Court of Human Rights could change
sovereign debt restructuration” in Haskell and Rasulov (Eds.), New Voices and New
Perspectives in International Economic Law (Springer, 2020), pp. 153–171.
195. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 2012) 263.
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Europe196 also decided against the State, which was found to have waived
immunity.197 As explained by the German Federal Court of Justice,198 in line
with a 2007 decision by the Federal Constitutional Court,199 not even after the
GFC has a general international law principle developed which allows a State
to simply refuse to pay its creditors because of the existence of a state of
economic emergency. It appears that the contract cannot be intentionally
breached by the State as a party but, at least in European law, it might
exceptionally be re-regulated by the State as a sovereign, to allow a majority of
private parties to agree to a haircut. The importance of contract terms200 and
contract law as a relevant instrument against the background of financial
stability clearly emerges: contract terms do, in fact, play a role – although it
remains debatable how important a role – for sovereign debts.201 The
repercussions of this approach on the sanctity of contract – the doctrine which
has often and controversially permeated sovereign debt enforcement litigation
since the mid-1980s202 – are noticeable.203 Yet, this all relates to the quite
atypical area of sovereign bond contracts, which are characterized by a
specific yet problematic amalgamation of public and private interests. How
does this relate to entirely private transactions? Due consideration needs to be
given to EU contract law.
196. As an exception, Italian Court of Cassation, ruling No. 11225/2005 of 21 April 2005.
197. See in particular the UK Supreme Court,NMLCapital Ltd v. Argentina, [2011] UKSC
31, reversing a Court of Appeal ruling that Argentina was protected by immunity.
198. German Federal Court of Justice, No. XI ZR 193/14 of 24 Feb. 2015.
199. German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG), 2 BvM 1/03, 2 BvM 2/03, 2 BvM
3/03, 2 BvM 4/03, 2 BvM 5/03, 2 BvM 1/06, 2 BvM 2/06, 8 May 2007.
200. Probably also as a consequence of the lessons learnt from the problems with
Argentinian bonds, which did not include such clauses, CACs have become “the tool that has
gained the most support over the last decade, and that states and international finance
institutions mainly rely on to ease sovereign debt restructurings”. Iversen, “The future of
involuntary sovereign debt restructurings:Mamatas and Others v Greece and the protection of
holdings of sovereign debt instruments under the ECHR”, 14 Capital Markets Law Journal
(2019), 34–58, at 49.
201. Mark, Weidemaier and Gulati, “International finance and sovereign debt” in Parisi
(Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Volume 3: Public Law and Legal
Institutions (OUP, 2017), pp. 482–500.
202. Gathi, “The sanctity of sovereign loan contracts and its origins in enforcement
litigation”, 38George Washington International LawReview (2006), 251–326, at 323, suggests
that the consequence of the approach as developed in particular by US Courts is “the virtual
elimination of balancing considerations – such as comity and the act of state doctrine – in
enforcement litigation”.
203. See Porzecanski, “Behind the Greek default and restructuring of 2012”, MPRA Paper
Series, No. 44166, 2012.
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EU contract law is not new to forms of instrumentalization. In fact, its
history is tightly linked with that of competition,204 as approximation of laws
was part of the project of achieving a level playing field within the Single
Market.205 The creation of a “competitive contract law”206 was not without
controversy: given that goal, deregulation might be needed whenever
excessive levels of protection amount to barriers to trade. The possible
contrast between protection and competition was smoothed out, and
immediate deregulatory consequences were avoided through the use of
minimum harmonization, as well as by setting a high standard of consumer
protection.207 Significantly, the possible deregulatory effect was felt more
strongly in the case of full harmonization directives.208
Nonetheless, as the EU strives to regain stability, the principle of
competition has largely been suspended.209 The incorporation of the goal of
financial stability might create tension in a contract law which has been
developed mostly to achieve competition. A first level of conflict arises
between competitive contract law and financially stable contract law.
Competitive contract law aims at harmonizing rules, in order not to place
additional burdens on some traders, and at empowering contract parties
through information, in order to allow them to fulfil their role of rational and
fully informed actors, as required by an ideal competitive market. The
attention paid to stability shifts the focus from information to product
regulation, which is necessary to restrict services and practices that are
deemed to be detrimental to financial stability, and promote so-called “plain
vanilla” financial instruments.
The change of paradigm has already led to the suggestion that newer
directives are characterized by a somewhat “paternalistic” approach leading to
a possible decrease of freedom of contract.210 Certainly, considering the
known and well-founded criticisms that have been canvassed against the
information paradigm, the move towards stability might appear to be
beneficial to consumer protection, at least if one accepts that protection is
better served by a more interventionist approach and assuming that regulation
204. See Grundmann, “The role of competition in the European codification process” in
Micklitz and Cafaggi (Eds.), European Private Law after the Common Frame of Reference
(Elgar, 2010), pp. 36–55.
205. Micklitz, “The transformation of private law through competition”, 22 ELJ (2016),
627–643.
206. Ibid.
207. In the interest of consumers, some limitations to competition are allowed. See Joined
Cases C-94 & 202/04, Cipolla, EU:C:2006:758.
208. See Joined Cases C-261 & 299/07, VTB-VAB NV v. Total, EU:C:2009:244.
209. Micklitz, op. cit. supra note 205.
210. Cherednychenko, “Freedom of contract in the post-crisis era: Quo vadis?”, 10
European Review of Contract Law (2014), 390–421.
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itself does not have a destabilizing effect on the economy. But as we move
from competitive contract law to financially stable contract law, is it possible
that consumer protection might need to be lowered in order to give way to
stability? A second possible level of conflict emerges, this time between
consumer protection and financial stability. This is not to say that, otherwise,
consumer protection law would be an area free of conflicts,211 but the
inclusion of a further objective, possibly hierarchically superordinate through
its recognition in EU economic law, can put further pressure on the other
values.
The possibility that excessively protective rules and judgments might be
detrimental to the stability of the financial system has already been aired,
based on the concern that the costs associated with protection might simply be
unbearable for the other, systemically important, party. In anticipation of the
famous Ille Papier decision by the German Federal Court of Justice on
advisory liability for the mis-selling of financial derivatives,212
representatives of the defendant bank, fearing a decision which would
translate into losses of 1 billion euros, lamented that the judgment would have
such repercussions overall as to trigger a new financial crisis.213 This, perhaps
exaggerated,214 macroeconomic concern has rarely translated into a legal
argument tested in courts.
The issue has nonetheless been indirectly addressed by the ECJ, in the
Gutiérrez Naranjo case.215 The case originated in the context of the Spanish
debt and housing crisis, as EU consumer law – and the Unfair Terms Directive
more in particular216 – was invoked to shield consumers against the now
socially unsustainable effects of onerous credit agreements. Against that
background, the Supreme Court of Spain had concluded that clauses in
mortgage loan agreements establishing a minimum rate below which the
variable rate of interest could not fall (“floor clauses”) were unfair as they
were non-transparent, in consequence of the fact that the consumer had not
211. See Adams and Brownsword, “The ideologies of contract”, 7 Legal Studies (1987),
205–223, at 213.
212. German Federal Court of Justice, No. XI ZR 33/10.
213. Jansen, annotation of Judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice of
Germany) of 22 March 2011 “Passion to inform— BGH expands banks’ advisory duties”, 12
GLJ (2011), 1492–1509.
214. Dastis, “Change of circumstances (Section 313 BGB) Trigger for the next financial
crisis?”, 23 E.R.P.L. (2015), 85–99.
215. Joined Cases C-154, 307 & 308/15, Gutiérrez Naranjo, EU:C:2016:980.
216. On the relevance of the Directive in the context of post-crisis litigation, see Micklitz
and Reich, “The Court and sleeping beauty: The revival of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive
(UCTD)”, 51 CML Rev. (2014), 771–808.
CML Rev. 2021422 Comparato
been sufficiently informed of the legal and financial consequences of those
terms. At the same time, the Supreme Court had limited the possible
economically perturbing effects of its ruling, excluding its retroactivity
affecting existing contracts.217 The reasoning was rooted in legal certainty
rather than financial stability: the clauses themselves were considered to be
lawful, as unfairness only stemmed from the fact that consumers had not been
sufficiently informed in specific circumstances. Reasons of legal certainty,
nonetheless, merged with economic considerations: in justifying the
limitation of the temporal effects, the Supreme Court of Spain referred to the
case law of the ECJ itself. In the earlier (2013) case RWE,218 concerning the
unfairness of terms in contracts for the supply of gas allowing the supplier to
unilaterally alter the price of the service, macroeconomic concerns had been
raised, as the German Government in its written observations asked the Court
to limit the temporal effects of its judgment. This was due to “the serious
financial consequences that could be produced with respect to a large number
of gas supply contracts in Germany, bringing about a substantial loss for the
undertakings concerned”.219 Following its established case law on the
issue,220 the ECJ found in that regard that “only in altogether exceptional cases
may the Court, in application of the general principle of legal certainty
inherent in the legal order of the European Union, be moved to restrict for any
person concerned the opportunity of relying on a provision which it has
interpreted with a view to calling into question legal relationships established
in good faith”, pointing to the necessity of “two essential criteria”, i.e. that
those concerned have acted in good faith and that “there is a risk of serious
difficulties”.221 Since those financial consequences for gas supply
undertakings could not be determined on the sole basis of the interpretation of
EU law given by the Court in that case, the argument was unsuccessful.222
Against that background, the Supreme Court of Spain considered that
precisely the possible repercussions on the economic system – due to the sum
217. Spanish Supreme Court, judgments 241/12 of 9 May 2013, No. 139/2015 of 25 March
2015 and No. 222/2015 of 29 April 2015.
218. Case C-92/11, RWEVertrieb, EU:C:2013:180.
219. Ibid., para 57.
220. Case C-57/93, Vroege, EU:C:1994:352. In Case 43/75, Defrenne, EU:C:1976:56,
paras. 70 and 71, the Court noted that: “In view of the large number of people concerned such
claims, which undertakings could not have foreseen, might seriously affect the financial
situation of such undertakings and even drive some of them to bankruptcy”, “Although the
practical consequences of any judicial decision must be carefully taken into account, it would
be impossible to go so far as to diminish the objectivity of the law and compromise its future
application on the ground of the possible repercussions which might result, as regards the past,
from such a judicial decision.”
221. Case C-92/11, RWEVertrieb, para 59.
222. Ibid., paras. 61 and 62.
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of all the awards of damages in possibly many thousands of lawsuits223 –
fulfilled the “serious difficulties” criterion. Incidentally, it may be noted that
limiting the temporal effects of judgments is a technique which has already
been employed by constitutional courts especially in the wake of the European
debt crisis.224 For instance, in its 2012 decision, already mentioned above, the
Portuguese Constitutional Court limited the effects of a declaration of
unconstitutionality of certain austerity measures taken against the background
of conditionality, conscious that “an unqualified declaration of
unconstitutionality could endanger the maintenance of the agreed financing
and thus the State’s solvency”.225
In Gutiérrez Naranjo, however, when the Spanish lower courts asked
whether the approach of the Supreme Court was compatible with the Unfair
Terms Directive, the ECJ ultimately answered in the negative. The ECJ found
that limiting the temporal effects of the finding of invalidity would undermine
its dissuasive effect, rooted in the principle of effectiveness. The Court did not
explicitly frame the issue in terms of a contrast between stability and
protection, thus adopting a narrower approach to the question. At the same
time, the Court notably departed from the Opinion of Advocate General
Mengozzi, who instead engaged more openly with the background of the case
and clearly referred to a tension between consumer protection and financial
stability, striking a balance in favour of stability. The Advocate General
recognized, approving of the approach of the Spanish Supreme Court, that
“the stability of an economic sector . . . is a concern shared by the EU legal
order”.226 There is in fact a range of cases in other domains, particularly in the
health sector, which involve delicate conflicts between EU rights and the
stability of national social security systems, and in which considerations
relating to the latter have been deemed capable of justifying some limitations
to the former.227 With regard to consumer protection, nonetheless, broader
considerations relating to the stability of the financial sector were not
accepted by the ECJ, as the principle of effectiveness played a more prominent
role.
223. Spanish Supreme Court, judgment No. 139/2015, 9(4).
224. See Italian Constitutional Court, judgment No. 10/2015 of 9 Feb. 2015. For a
discussion see Faraguna, “The economic crisis as a threat to the stability of the law: Recent
developments in the case law of the Italian Constitutional Court”, 8 HJRL (2016), 249–270.
225. Portuguese Constitutional Court, No. 353/12. Summary in English available at <www
.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/en/acordaos/20120353s.html>.
226. Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi in Joined Cases C-154, 307 & 308/15, EU:C:2016:552,
para 74.
227. Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits v. Stichting Ziekenfonds, EU:C:2001:404. Most
recently, Case C-243/19, Vesel ı-bas ministrija, EU:C:2020:872.
CML Rev. 2021424 Comparato
5. Trade-offs and offshoots
Finding univocal trends in the range of disparate cases which have been
considered is not straightforward. It appears that while in some instances
financial stability is regarded as a goal of paramount importance which
justifies compressions of shareholder and investor protection in light of a
burden-sharing philosophy, the same has not happened in other
circumstances. In consumer contract law in particular, the ECJ avoided
accepting arguments based on stability, even though it was explicitly advised
to do so. There are in fact good reasons for requiring investors to bear part of
the costs of bank failure,228 and while stability might justify limitations to
investor protection when it comes to their property and corporate rights, it
does not necessarily do so when it comes to the protection of the consumer in
certain contractual relations such as, notably, mortgage agreements: financial
stability means different things in the context of investments and consumer
debts. In fact, shareholders and investors are the, theoretically well-informed,
holders of risky financial instruments while the consumer is understood to be
risk-adverse.
At the same time, the category of the small investor remains somehow
ambiguous. While a complex system of statutory rights is specifically linked
to retail investment services, the distinction between institutional and small
investors has not been decisive in cases in which State measures aimed at
stability impacted on the rights of both classes. In Mamatas, the ECtHR
stressed that investing in bonds is not a risk-free activity229 and rejected the
claim based on an alleged discrimination between majority and holdout
bondholders – the former being institutional investors and the latter being
unsophisticated retail investors – pointing out the difficulty in drawing that
distinction,230 the volatility of the bond market231 and, tellingly, the negative
repercussions on the Greek economy of excluding some investors from the
haircut.232 Courts also found against the investors in the Northern Rock cases
which involved complaints from both retail shareholders, who held shares for
retirement purposes, and hedge funds. In that regard, it has been speculated
that, perhaps, “a group of retail investors who had held the shares for long
periods of time might have received a somewhat more sympathetic hearing
228. Chalmers, Davies and Monti, op. cit. supra note 104, p. 1004.
229. Appl. Nos. 63066/14, 64297/14 and 66106/14, Mamatas, cited supra note 194, para
117.
230. Ibid., para 137.
231. Ibid., para 136.
232. Ibid., para 138.
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from both courts”.233 Regulatory reforms promoted to increase financial
stability as well as judgments favourable to consumers in financial
transactions aim at ensuring that unsophisticated investors are not offered
risky products.
Importantly, the nature of the subjects involved in the disputes is also
particularly relevant. References to financial stability play one role when they
are invoked by public entities to justify a compression of private rights –
although measures might still be reviewed in light of fundamental rights – and
a different, apparently less successful, role in the context of litigations
between private parties, where the instability of the system at large is feared as
a possible consequential effect of decisions which might immediately impact
on the financial stability of a firm. In that latter context, it has been suggested
in the literature that, at least at the present stage of the legal evolution,
“financial stability concerns invoked by the firms, and not supported by legal
provisions, do not justify a reduction of the standard of protection for retail
clients”.234
Does the approach of the ECJ in consumer law possibly mean that
consumer protection remains conceptually shielded against broader
macroeconomic considerations, to the point that in practice it is likely always
to prevail in the case of a conflict? This is not likely to be the case. Private law
already strikes balances between opposing interests in light of
macroeconomic objectives, pursuing social policy and possibly rejecting
solutions which are economically undesirable or inefficient.235 Predominant
interpretations of contract law doctrines already represent the outcome of a
balancing of interests where different conceptions of stability can play a
role,236 while the above-mentioned reforms to EU consumer law are in fact an
attempt to strike a new balance between opposing private interests.
233. Waibel, “ECHR leaves Northern Rock shareholders out in the cold”, EJIL:Talk!, 3
Aug. 2012, available at <www.ejiltalk.org/echr-leaves-northern-rock-shareholders-out-in-the-
cold/>.
234. Della Negra, op. cit. supra note 60, p. 189.
235. As is well known, the idea that in particular the common law, as opposed to legislation,
is economically efficient was advocated by early law and economics scholars, see Ehrlich and
Posner, “An economic analysis of legal rulemaking”, 3 Journal of Legal Studies (1974),
257–286.
236. The doctrine of frustration or change of circumstances might offer an illustration. The
difficult application of the doctrine as a tool to invalidate excessively onerous financial
contracts in the wake of the GFC is rooted in the fact that the law circumscribes the application
of the doctrine to exceptional circumstances in order to avoid it being used as an escape route
from bad bargains, favouring legal certainty and stability of the contract over possibly opposite
considerations. For a comparative overview of the relevance of that doctrine in the GFC, see the
contributions in Başoğlu (Ed.), The Effects of Financial Crises on the Binding Force of
Contracts – Renegotiation, Rescission or Revision (Springer, 2016).
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On occasion, and in particular when it is necessary to foster innovative
interpretations, judges might explicitly refer to policy considerations to reach
their decisions, as for instance – sticking with the area of financial services –
in the famous House of Lords decision in Barclays v. O’Brien237 on undue
influence, based on the necessity to mediate between surety protection and the
need to maintain the functioning of the credit market.238 In other cases, the
balancing between stability and protection, even when not explicitly
articulated, might be mediated through the application of open-ended
doctrines: again in Gutiérrez Naranjo, the ECJ’s reasoning was rooted in the
necessity to ensure the principle of effectiveness. Yet effectiveness is a
contested notion which has served the aim of achieving different purposes in
the jurisprudence of the ECJ,239 even within the same area of consumer
protection,240 becoming an instrument through which opposite exigencies
have been balanced and some interests have been promoted over others. In this
sense, the reluctance of the ECJ to engage in macroeconomic considerations
inGutiérrez Naranjo can be understood as an expression of a macroeconomic
consideration itself: by refusing to support the concerns related to the
economic situation of one party, i.e. the banks, the Court ultimately protected
the interests of another, i.e. the consumer debtor.Accepting an argument based
on the macroeconomic dimension of the dispute would have been detrimental
to the socioeconomic rights of the consumer, in contrast to previous
“constitutionalized” consumer law cases exemplified by Aziz,241 where
precisely that recognition contributed to consumer and debtor protection.242
In sum, contrary to the impression that it is a coherent notion which equally
irradiates in the whole legal system, financial stability appears to play
different roles when considered in different contexts, where it has to be
balanced with the need to protect disparate subjects and values.
In light of the above-mentioned tensions and trade-offs, it is clear why the
2017 Consumer Financial Services Action Plan by the European Commission
declared that “EU law aims to strike a balance between the freedom to provide
financial services and sufficient safeguards for consumers and market
237. Barclays Bank plc v. O’Brien, [1993] UKHL 6.
238. See Collins, “Utility and rights in common law reasoning: Rebalancing private law
through constitutionalization”, 30 Dalhousie Law Journal (2007), 1–25.
239. Episcopo, “Judicial law-making and the principle of effectiveness in EU (private)
law”, Working Papers Jean Monnet Chair European Private Law, Working Paper 1/2019.
240. Della Negra, “The uncertain development of the case law on consumer protection in
mortgage enforcement proceedings: Sanchez Morcillo and Kušinová”, 52 CML Rev. (2015),
1009–1032.
241. Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i
Manresa (Catalunyacaixa), EU:C:2013:164.
242. In this sense, see C. Mak, “Gutiérrez Naranjo: On limits in law and limits of law”, 43
EL Rev. (2018), 447–459.
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stability”.243 Depending on the way in which that balance is struck, further
collateral effects might also be produced. Indirectly recognizing the tension
between conflicting objectives, the MCD hints at the necessity that “adequate
alternative arrangements are in place to ensure that policy objectives relating
to financial stability and the internal market can be met without impeding
financial inclusion and access to credit”.244 The move towards stability has, in
fact, a restrictive effect which in turn produces financial exclusion, raising the
puzzling question whether financial inclusion is best achieved through
increased protection or increased access. Are consumers better off included in
a possibly risky financial market or when they are kept out of it for their own
good? This question, which has long been discussed in consumer law and
economics,245 cannot in fact ever aspire to a definitive and univocal answer, as
the choice between access and protection will depend on a balancing exercise
which is, itself, unstable. The level of protection or exclusion which is
acceptable depends on decisions which need to take into account a plurality of
variables, ranging from the safety-net provisions provided for by the welfare
State246 to the level of competition in the market.
6. Conclusion
Three key elements emerge at the end of these considerations. First, especially
in the last decade, an international economic policy of financial stability has
arisen which is capable of justifying a new instrumentalization of private law.
Second, while financial stability and consumer protection might appear to be
mutually reinforcing, that development should be considered with a cautious
attitude, as the incorporation of stability considerations within private law
produces, of necessity, tensions with other values underlying that field. Third,
as emerged by looking at the European multilevel system, the tensions
between those values can be solved differently in different contexts, casting
further doubts on the consistency of the notion of financial stability, which
now appears to play different roles in various areas where it has to be balanced
with the need to protect different subjects.
For those who share the widespread criticisms against forms of investor and
consumer protection based (solely) on information, the international
243. Commission Communication, “Consumer Financial Services Action Plan: Better
Products, More Choice”, COM(2017)139 final, 3.1.
244. MCD, Recital 17.
245. Cayne and Trebilcock, “Market considerations in the formulation of consumer
protection policy”, 23 University of Toronto Law Journal (1973), 396–430, at 427.
246. See Domurath, Consumer Vulnerability and Welfare in Mortgage Contracts
(Bloomsbury/Hart, 2017).
CML Rev. 2021428 Comparato
emergence of financial stability, chipping away at competition and sowing its
seeds in private law, might appear as an improvement in terms of consumer
protection, even leaving aside the question of its possible exclusionary side
effects and of the systemic repercussions of possibly flawed regulations. Yet,
the suggestion that protection might simply follow stability or stability might
follow protection is debatable, because the coexistence of the goals will
demand trade-offs. Consequently, the interplay between the notions cannot
also mean interchangeability, as if consumer protection in private law were an
alternative to financial regulation of business conduct and vice versa. The
MCD provides yet another example. Both the Directive and its commentators
rightly emphasize that its policy considerations find their roots in the
under-regulation of the US subprime mortgage market. It is also true,
however, that a more crucial role in that crisis was played by the securitization
of underperforming loans, so that a regulatory emphasis on the origination of
the loan might be only partially successful – or not successful at all – in
addressing the key issues of financial stability, if financial regulation does not
sufficiently address further aspects of the market. This should not be taken as
an argument against instrumentalization of private law per se, which would
presuppose an ideological view of private law as apolitical and detached from
its macroeconomic context. On the contrary, it calls for a comprehensive
approach which considers the necessary and mutual interplay between the
regulatory environment and private law in the pursuit of given
socio-economic objectives. The concrete meaning of the abstract notion of
stability will be determined by that interaction.
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